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BOOK REVIEW 
WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Philip B. Kurland.* The 
University of Chicago Press. 1978. Pp. 224. $12.50. 
Reviewed by Rex E. Lee** 
Among the "Watergate" books, this one is distinctive in sev- 
eral respects. It was not written by one of the Watergate insiders, 
nor was the author involved in any aspect of uncovering or dis- 
closing events relating to the demise and fall of Richard Nixon. 
It is further distinguished because it is the most scholarly of the 
books bearing a Watergate-related title. 
Philip B. Kurland is one of the most astute, one of the most 
productive, and one of the most respected American constitu- 
tional scholars of this century.' Watergate and the Constitution 
is typical of the quality of his work. It is a careful, thoughtful, 
well-researched, and crisply presented statement of Professor 
Kurland's views concerning some of the important constitutional 
lessons he believes our nation should have learned from the 
events and conditions we lump together under the heading 
"Watergate." The most sophisticated constitutional scholar will 
find it provocative. At the same time, the casual student of gov- 
ernment with an interest in the long-range welfare of our Repub- 
lic-and I would hope that includes most of us-will find it un- 
derstandable and interesting reading. 
* Philip B. Kurland is the William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor 
a t  the University of Chicago, where he has been a Professor of Law for 22 years. He 
graduated from Harvard Law School, where he was President of the Harvard Law Review, 
and later served as law clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter. He received his Doctor of Laws 
degree from the University of Notre Dame. Professor Kurland founded and edits The 
Supreme Court Review, and has published numerous books including Politics, the Consti- 
tution and the Warren Court and Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Constitution. 
** Dean and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer- 
sity. B.A., 1960, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1963, University of Chicago. Assistant 
United States Attorney General, May 1975-January 1977. 
1. The IJniversity of Mississippi School of Law Memorial Lectures, 45 MISS.  L.J. 529, 
529 (1974): 
When Phil Kurland was appointed Chief Consultant to  the United States Sen- 
ate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers in 1967, Senator Sam Ervin, chair- 
man of the subcommittee, said: 
Professor Kurland is one of the greatest authorities on the United 
States Constitution that America has ever known. He is not only a 
scholar in the traditional sense of knowing court decisions and their 
trends, he is also a brilliant legal technician, an eloquent writer, and 
one of those rare men who know the language, the intent, and the 
history of the Constitution. 
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These encomiums are not intended to imply, however, that 
all of Professor Kurland's conclusions are correct. One of his dom- 
inant themes is that our national welfare would be better served, 
and protection against future misuses of power better secured, if 
Congress would play a more prominent role vis-a-vis the other 
two branches. That is a popular theme these days, and no one 
articulates it any better than Kurland. He sees in the judiciary a 
demonstrated proclivity to usurp the fundamental policymaking 
prerogative of the Legislature under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation. In this he is correct, though for reasons discussed 
below I disagree with his view concerning some of the implica- 
tions of this premise. He also views with alarm the expansion of 
power in what he refers to as the "Imperial Presidency" or (bor- 
rowing a term from Arthur Schlesinger) the "Plebiscitary Presi- 
dency." Kurland correctly recognizes, as Schlesinger does not, 
that the increased power of the Presidency is not a Nixonian nor 
a Republican phenomenon, and that the Democratic occupants 
of the White House over the past half century have also contrib- 
uted their fair share to this trend. 
In Professor Kurland's view, one of the major lessons of Wa- 
tergate is that the Presidency has become too powerful, that the 
augmentation of Presidential power has been accomplished 
largely a t  the expense of Congress, and that Congress must reas- 
sert its authority. On these matters, I find myself in substantial 
disagreement with my former professor. Although I am not cer- 
tain what the best preventative for future Watergates is, my own 
experience in government has taught me that Congress is no more 
immune from excesses of power than is the President. It is true 
tha t  article I disperses congressional authority between two 
Houses and among 535 individuals. Article 11, by contrast, vests 
all executive authority in one individual, the President. But that 
argument cuts both ways. Certainly there is no single Senator or 
Representative as powerful as the President. However, i t  is 
equally apparent that it is much more difficult to locate the re- 
sponsibility for misuse of power where the responsibility for its 
exercise is diffused among so many. 
In his search for protection against the recurrence of 
Watergate-type excesses, Professor Kurland proposes institu- 
tional changes. In one respect, that  is laudable: institutional 
correctives do not depend on the quality or honesty of the people 
who occupy the offices of government, and they last beyond peri- 
odic personnel changes. The kinds of institutional changes advo- 
cated by Watergate and the Constitution, however, pose serious 
questions for the cornerstone principle of the American Constitu- 
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tion, separation of powers. This is particularly true of Kurland's 
endorsement of the provisions of S. 495 calling for the creation of 
an Office of Congressional Legal C ~ u n s e l , ~  his support of in- 
creased congressional involvement in the oversight of the intelli- 
gence community, and his argument that the courts should stay 
out of disputes between the legislative and executive branches 
concerning the competing claims of each for constitutionally 
based jurisdiction. With regard to this final issue, I recognize that 
deciding between competing claims for jurisdictional turf neces- 
sarily involves the courts in significant policymaking decisions. 
But Professor Kurland's alternative-leaving the issue to the 
final decision of Congress-is worse. It would vest in one of the 
competing players the enviable combined role of competitor and 
referee. 
It may well be that Congress should play a larger role, and 
that if Congress would do so, one of the results would be to insure 
against future excesses such as we experienced during the Water- 
gate period. But if Congress is to play a greater role, it should be 
safely within the boundaries contemplated by the principle of 
separation of powers. That is, if there are excesses, and Congress 
is to correct them, Congress should do so by passing statutes, 
rather than by attempting to implement public policy through 
enforcement of statutes already passed. Establishing a perma- 
nent litigating force to implement public policy and administer- 
ing the nation's intelligence activities are both activities that 
smack of law enforcement and law implementation. Under our 
system of separation of powers that  responsibility belongs to an- 
other branch of government. Congress' job, and a very difficult 
one, is to make policy, not to enforce it. Lawmaking involves hard 
policy choices, the kind of decisionmaking that inevitably invites 
criticism from someone. It is much easier, and much safer, for 
Congress to use its resources in examining whether some other 
branch of government is doing its job properly. 
There is a time and place for congressional inquiry. To the 
extent that there needs to be greater congressional involvement 
in the prevention of future Watergates, however, it should be in 
the direction of greater exercise of Congress' constitutional re- 
sponsibility-the making of laws. I t  should not be in the direction 
of usurpation of the responsibilities of its sister branch-the en- 
forcement of laws. 
Finally, I have serious doubts concerning the preventative 
2. S .  495, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONC. REC. 1828-32 (1975). 
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value of institutional changes. Ironically, institutional changes 
can sometimes be counterproductive because of the sentiment of 
security they engender. It can be a comforting assurance to our 
national psyche that effective changes have been built into the 
governmental system. The result, however, can sometimes be a 
diminution of concern for the real causes of the problem, which 
are human rather than institutional. Professor Kurland lauds 
Attorney General Levi's creation of the Office of Professional Re- 
sponsibility within the Justice Department and expresses the 
view that it is an effective step toward protecting against high- 
level Justice Department improprieties such as occurred under 
Attorney General Mitchell. I served with Edward Levi in the 
Justice Department a t  the time the Office of Professional Respon- 
sibility was created. I believe it will be a long time before we see 
a repetition of the improprieties of the Nixon-Mitchell era at  the 
Department of Justice. If this belief becomes reality, it will be 
principally because of the work of Edward H. Levi-but not be- 
cause of any formal institutional changes he made, and certainly 
not because of his creation of the Office of Professional Responsi- 
bility. Rather, it will be because of the example he set in putting 
a level of lawyer-client insulation and independence between 1000 
Constitution Avenue and 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. It was Ed- 
ward Levi the man, with his superb combination of competence 
as a lawyer and morality as a human being, who brought the 
Department of Justice from where he found it in early 1975 to 
where he left it two years later. 
Some institutional changes may do some good. Others may 
simply divert attention from the real problem. In any event, the 
real key to successful government, to government that warrants 
the respect of its citizens, and to the prevention of future Water- 
gates lies not so much in change of governmental institutions as 
in the quality and the morals of the people who run them. 
